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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERIC ABEL ROYBAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 44984
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-6681

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Roybal contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence
in this case, and, in particular, by denying his request for a withheld judgment. Specifically, he
asserts the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in his case in reaching
that decision. Therefore, this Court should remand this case for a new sentencing hearing and an
order withholding judgment, or, alternatively, reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Roybal entered an Alford plea1 to the charge of
possession of methamphetamine, and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a pending
misdemeanor charge and recommend the district court impose a suspended sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed. 2 (Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.4.) The underlying offense constituted
Mr. Roybal’s first felony conviction.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),

pp.3-6, 12.) The presentence investigator also noted that Mr. Roybal, who was 55 years old at
the time, only presented a moderate risk to reoffend and had a support system of friends in place.
(PSI, pp.1, 11-12.) Mr. Roybal also reported that he holds an associate’s degree in math and
electronics. (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5; PSI, pp.8-9.)
The GAIN-I evaluation gave rule-out diagnoses for several mental health issues,
including major depression, somatic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and
recommended Mr. Roybal participate in intensive outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.16-17, 26.) The
GAIN-I also included a diagnosis for alcohol abuse, but the district court concluded Mr. Roybal
had not disclosed all the relevant information about his drug use during the presentence
evaluations. (See PSI, pp.16-17; Tr., p.41, Ls.5-16.) The mental health review agreed with the
GAIN-I’s treatment recommendation and also recommended that Mr. Roybal receive help in
managing his medications for his mental health issues.

(PSI, p.30.)

In fact, during his

presentence incarceration, Mr. Roybal attempted to complete programs available in the jail, but

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
On his guilty plea questionnaire, it appears Mr. Roybal mistakenly circled the answer “Yes” in
response to the question about whether he was waiving his right to appeal the judgment and
sentence as part of his plea. (See R., p.114.) No such waiver is required under the settlement
offer made by the State (see R,. pp.118-20), nor was any such waiver mentioned as part of the
terms of the plea agreement at the change of plea hearing. (See generally Tr.)
2

2

needed to receive stronger medications before he was able to meaningfully participate in those
programs. (Tr., p.31, Ls.2-7.)
At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested that the district court
withhold judgment over Mr. Roybal for a five-year term of probation. (Tr., p.33, Ls.8-11.)
Alternatively, he recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of five years, with
one year fixed. (Tr., p.33, Ls.15-16.) However, the district court rejected both recommendations
and imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, which it suspended for a
seven-year term of probation. (Tr., p.37, Ls.11-24.)
Mr. Roybal filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.126,
145.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to withhold judgment and imposing
an excessive sentence.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Withhold Judgment And Imposing An
Excessive Sentence
The refusal to grant a request for withheld judgment is one within the district court’s
discretion. See State v. Edghill, 134 Idaho 218, 219 (Ct. App. 2000). The examination of
whether a withheld judgment was appropriate turns on a similar analysis to the determination of
whether an imposed sentence is excessive. See State v. Geier, 109 Idaho 963, 965-66 (Ct. App.
1985).
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
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consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)
(articulating the standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider when
imposing a sentence. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). The Idaho Supreme
Court has indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to
achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds
as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
The district court did not reach its decision to impose Mr. Roybal’s sentence in an
exercise of reason because it did not sufficiently consider the impact of the mitigating factors on
the goals of sentencing. The statutory authority to withhold a judgment (I.C. § 19-2601(3)) is
designed to allow the district court “to spare the defendant, particularly a first time offender, the
burden of a criminal record.” State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 793 (1996) (internal quotation
omitted). There are several collateral consequences tied specifically to a felony conviction. See,
e.g., IDAHO CONST. art VI, §3 (a convicted felon may not vote or hold civil office); I.C. § 183316 (a convicted felon cannot possess a firearm); I.C. § 32-603 (a felony conviction may be the
basis for a person’s spouse to be granted a divorce); see also Michael Pinard, An Integrated
Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced
by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 623, 635 (2006) (identifying various state
and federal consequences to a felony conviction which impact all levels of a person’s life).
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Thus, withholding judgment when a person is convicted of their first felony serves the goal of
rehabilitation, as it promotes more effective reintegration of the person into society as a
productive and contributing member thereof due to the fact it allows them the opportunity to
avoid these collateral consequences.
A sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in this case demonstrates that a
withheld judgment would have been appropriate in this case (as would, alternatively, a shorter
underlying sentence). Mr. Roybal was 55 years old at the time of this, his first felony offense.
(PSI, pp.1, 3-6, 12.) As such, he has demonstrated some ability (though not always perfectly
(see PSI, pp.3-6)) to conform his behavior to societal expectations. He has employable skills as
evidenced by his advanced degree. (See Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5.) Therefore, he is the type of person
who, with the benefit of a withheld judgment, could reintegrate himself as a contributing member
of society. Additionally, he has a support network in place (PSI, p.12), which means he is more
likely to be successful in such efforts. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010).
Furthermore, as part of this case, Mr. Roybal has been diagnosed with, and begun
receiving treatment for, several mental health issues.

(See PSI, pp.9-10, 16-17; Tr., p.31,

Ls.2-7.) He reported receiving some benefit from past mental health counseling. (PSI, p.10.)
And, as defense counsel pointed out, once Mr. Roybal began receiving appropriate medication to
control the symptoms of those conditions, he was able to begin meaningfully participating in
available treatment programs in the jail. (Tr., p.31, Ls.2-7.) True, as the district court indicated,
there were likely additional issues, particularly in regard to drug use, that would need to be dealt
with in the course of Mr. Roybal’s rehabilitation efforts (see Tr., p.41, Ls.5-16), but the fact that
Mr. Roybal has shown some ability to meaningfully participate in rehabilitative programs while
receiving appropriate medication further reveals that the district court should have given him the
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opportunity to avoid the collateral consequences of a felony conviction via a withheld judgment
as he continues those efforts. It did, after all, conclude Mr. Roybal could effectively pursue
continued rehabilitation opportunities in the community. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.11-24) (suspending
Mr. Roybal’s sentence for a term of probation).)
Given a sufficient consideration of all the facts in the record, including all the mitigating
factors, the district court’s sentencing decisions, particularly its decision to not withhold
judgment, are revealed to be abuses of its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Roybal respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court for a
new sentencing hearing and an order withholding judgment. Alternatively, he requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2017.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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